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This report examines the trends in deployment of peacekeeping troops
by the United Nations to conflict areas. I argue that the most important
factor in the decision by the UN Security Council of whether or not to send
troops is the state of the international system. When there is discord amongst
the five permanent (P5) members of the UNSC, peacekeeping missions are
significantly less likely. Relatedly, I argue that P5 discord makes individual
members less likely to contribute to established missions. I test these and two
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What explains when and where UN peacekeepers are deployed? Burma,
the longest running civil war in the international system, has spanned nearly
60 years and has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Meanwhile, the
civil conflict in Ivory Coast in 2002 was relatively tame in comparison, lasting
around six years and claiming slightly over 1,000 deaths. Surprisingly, the UN
sent peacekeepers to Ivory Coast in 2004 but has yet to do so for Burma. Why
did the UN send troops to a post-conflict zone that has suffered significantly
less destruction and loss? These and other historical cases cast doubt on the
conventional wisdom of peacekeepers being sent “where they are needed” and
hint at other factors in the UN’s decision to deploy peacekeepers.
With the significant rise in the number of UN peacekeeping missions
since the end of the Cold War, there has been a similarly significant rise
in research [14, 1, 10, 11, 24] dedicated to answering the question of when
peacekeeping missions do (and do not) get sent. A variety of theories have
been put forth, from democracy promotion [1] to specific characteristics of the
conflict [10, 11]. However, there is little empirical and theoretical consensus
in the literature regarding peacekeeper deployment, suggesting that we still
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know little about UN deployment trends and further analysis is needed.
This paper investigates the characteristics that influence the UN’s de-
cision on whether it does or does not deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones.
I argue that UN peacekeeping deployment and non-deployment are mainly
driven by the relationship of the P5 members and the international political
environment; when the preferences of the P5 members are aligned, peacekeep-
ers are more likely to get sent to conflict zones. When there is significant
discord amongst the P5, as was the case through much of the Cold War,
U.N. peacekeeping missions are much less likely. Although there are factors
that make P5 members more likely to want a peacekeeping mission in a given
conflict zone, these desires are often overridden by veto power bargaining dy-
namics within the UNSC. Further, I argue that discord amongst the P5 not
only makes peacekeeping missions less likely, it also makes it less likely that
they will contribute their own troops to a mission if one has been approved.
Lastly, I posit the hypotheses that two unexamined characteristics of a conflict
area have an effect on the rate of peacekeeping deployment: P5 proximity to
a conflict area and prior P5 military involvement in the conflict.
Although a considerable amount of research has been done regarding
peacekeeping missions [1, 10, 11, 24] and UNSC dynamics [27, 31, 20], as of
yet these two fields have yet to be considered in concert. That is, researchers
have investigated institutional discord within the group of P5 and also what
sorts of conflicts receive peacekeepers, but not how the institutional dynamics
of the UNSC may play a large part in the decision to deploy forces. This
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article acts as a bridge of these two streams of literature and thereby provides
a more comprehensive explanation of peacekeeping deployment.
Using UNGA voting data combined with conflict data, I construct em-
pirical models to test my theory and I find support for the central hypothesis,
which suggests that patterns in UN peacekeeping mission deployment can be
traced back to UNSC agreement or discord and the state of the international
political environment. When discord amongst the P5 is high, peacekeeping
missions are considerably less likely to be deployed. I also find support for
the secondary hypothesis that prior P5 involvement in the conflict makes it
more likely that the UN will send a peacekeeping mission. After outlining
the extant literature, I go on to describe the research design, the model, and
then the empirical results. Finally, I discuss further avenues of research and




In the five years following the end of the Cold War, the UN deployed 20
peacekeeping missions, nearly a third of all the missions sent in its 65+ year
history. The rapid up-tick in deployment was, unsurprisingly, accompanied
by a similar growth in the amount of research dedicated to identifying and
understanding trends in peacekeeping. Chief amongst the questions examined
was which conflicts receive UN peacekeepers and which do not.
The answer to the question is important not only for policy but also
for the study of peacekeping more broadly. Peacekeepers getting deployed
to systematically “easy” cases, that is, post-conflict zones which are, ceteris
paribus, less likely to fall back into war, would lead us to overstate the effect of
peacekeepers as their presence would be spurious to continued peace. There
would be a selection effect of the cases that receive the “treatment” of peace-
keeping forces. Conversely, if peacekeepers are, as the folk theorem goes, “sent
where they are needed,” meaning difficult cases where the prospects of peace
are slim, empirical findings would actually understate their efficacy. Despite
the importance that a theory of where peacekeepers get sent bears on the re-
liability of any conclusions drawn as to their effectiveness, the field has yet to
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reach a consensus. I believe that this is due to the fact that prior research has
yet to consider the decision to send peacekeepers through the lens of relational
dynamics among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Existing explanations for peacekeeping deployment trends range from
European regional favoritism [14] to democracy promotion [1]. These theories
also vary in their focus on the characteristics of the target state [10, 11], the
international system [24], and the sending agency [14]. However, as mentioned
previously, as of yet there is not a consensus on which factors are driving UN
peacekeeping deployment. Two issues, one theoretical and one empirical, help
explain the dearth of robust findings.
The assertion that UN peacekeeping missions largely mirror great power
preferences is by no means a new theory. In reality, it is nested within the
popular folk theorem of the larger literature that the United Nations is no
more than an institutionalized opportunity for the great powers, most notably
the P5, to exercise control over the international system [7, 29, 3, 13]. Recent
literature even suggests that P5 members bribe non-permanent members of
the Security Council with aid in order to secure votes for their preferred poli-
cies [23, 4]. But if it is the case that the deployment of peacekeepers is simply
a reflection of the interest or importance that members of the P5 give to the
conflict, how do we capture this interest? Researchers have used a number of
concepts and proxies to attempt to capture this interest. For instance, Gilli-
gan and Stedman [14] employ two commonly-employed proxies, former colonial
status and trade flows, to test the theory that UN peacekeeping interventions
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are driven chiefly by P5 interests. Similarly, Fortna [11] uses former colonial
status as a proxy for great power interests. Gilligan and Stedman as well as
Fortna argue that there may be a sense of responsibility that colonial powers
feel for their former colonial holdings and this would make them more likely
to push for peacekeepers. Additionally, several studies [14, 3] posit that trade
flows between conflict states and P5 members can capture great power inter-
est; if a P5 member has “skin in the game” economically, it would be more
interested in the stability of a conflict zone. However, it is important to note
that although the analyses above consider why the P5 would be interested in
bringing peace to a conflict zone, they do not examine how the organization
of the UNSC facilitates or prevents deployment. More specifically, do perma-
nent members use their veto power, as well as the threat of a veto, to prevent
peacekeeper deployment?
Although substantial research has been done regarding the unique veto
situation in the UNSC and how it affects policy outcomes [32, 31] as well as how
UNSC blessing affects the legitimacy of state actions [16], no systematic study
has been undertaken regarding how preferences within the Security Council
affect peacekeeper deployment. This seems particularly salient given that from
1946 to 1990, 279 vetoes were issued by P5 members on issues voted upon by
the UNSC, whereas from 1990 to 1998 this number shrank to only eight. This
suggests that while it is necessary to consider what factors may interest a P5
member in pushing for peacekeepers, a large piece of the puzzle is missing if
one does not account for whether fellow P5 members would support (or at least
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not veto) the mission. As a starting point, Voeten [31] analyzes what he terms
the “outside option” in UNSC approval of the use of force in international
conflicts. Using a formal model, he argues that there is a strong correlation
between the preferences of the P5 and the bargaining space available to the
actors. When there is major discord in the UNSC and preferences vary widely
among the P5, the bargaining space is very small and no actor will push for the
authorized use of force. The fact that states can exercise the “outside option”
of carrying out military action with allies or organizations (such as NATO)
other than the UN widens the bargaining space and allows for cooperation
within the UNSC.
While the policy space differs in that Voeten examines the use of force
and my analysis focuses on peacekeeping, the issue of preference discrepancy
within the UNSC is helpful. Voeten’s results show that, as intuition might
suggest, discord within the UNSC largely precludes cooperation of the P5
members. This provides a useful framework with which to consider how the





Peacekeeping and the Global Order
I argue that ultimately trends in the deployment of UN peacekeeping
missions are a story of great power politics, more specifically the relational
dynamics of permanent members of the UN Security Council. Recent research
[11, 10] lends support to the claim that peacekeeping forces are, indeed, ef-
fective in bringing about and keeping peace. Assuming this to be the case,
the UN deploys peacekeeping forces in order to restore and maintain stability
by preventing future conflict. However, given that since the founding of the
UN the majority of conflicts have not received peacekeepers, clearly we must
consider what would prevent peacekeeping deployment. I argue that when
the preferences of the P5 are very misaligned, peacekeeping missions are less
likely. I also consider secondary hypotheses of the characteristics of a conflict
that would increase or depress P5 interest in sending peacekeeping missions.
However, before fully expanding upon the theory, it is necessary to establish
the definition of “peacekeeping” that is used in this paper.
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What is Peacekeeping?
As this project focuses specifically on UN peackeepers, which make
up the majority of peacekeeping missions deployed to conflict zones, I at-
tempted to pinpoint the UNs own definition. Oddly, this is surprisingly diffi-
cult, with official documents explaining what peacekeeping does but not what
it is. Therefore, I combine different facets of UN definitions of “peacekeep-
ing” to conceptualize it as such: peacekeeping is a military UN mission that
provides the security and political peacebuilding support to help states make
transition from conflict to peace. Not all UN peacekeeping missions involve
the use of troops and instead focus on aspects such as facilitating political
processes or monitoring elections. However, similar to previous work [6], I
categorize this as peacebuilding and instead look solely at missions involving
military and police personnel. One clear theoretical reason for this division and
conceptualization is that missions involving troops are, typically, both more
costly and more risky to the personnel involved. Because individual donor
states provide the troops and resources necessary to the UN, these higher
costs and risks should indicate greater buy-in on the part of the U.N. That is,
military missions are riskier and costlier, meaning that these types of missions
indicate greater importance to the U.N., especially the P5.
Veto Power and UNSC Discord
It is important to note that given a conflict, while a P5 member may
have a strong desire to send U.N. peacekeepers it cannot unilaterally do so
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and is constrained by the nature of the veto system within the U.N. Security
Council. As article 23 of the UN charter outlines, the Security Council is made
up of 15 members, five of which are non-permanent, meaning that they are
elected by the General Assembly to serve a two year term. The five permanent
members, the so-called P5, are the major power victors of World War II:
the United States, China, Russia, France, and the UK. In order to pass, a
resolution in the UNSC must have at least nine votes. Importantly, all five
permanent members have veto power over a vote; a resolution cannot pass if
any one of the P5 casts a dissenting vote.1
I argue that this veto power of the P5 within the Security Council plays
the chief role in whether or not peacekeepers get sent. When the preferences of
the permanent members are more similar overall, we should expect to see more
peacekeeping missions deployed. This is due to the veto power of any single
member as well as the implicit threat that this veto power carries. Similar to
the theory outlined by Voeten [31] above regarding UN approval of military
action by a state, the wide variation of preferences drastically shrinks the
bargaining space (in this case, an agreement on peacekeeping deployment).
Though with five members on the Security Council there is possibility
of discord between more than just two actors, by and large the preference
disparity is clearest between the United States and the Soviet Union, espe-
cially over particularly salient issues in the Cold War such as the Berlin Crisis
1A resolution can still pass given votes of abstention from P5 members.
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and the Cuban Missile Crisis. As Fravel [12] notes, though China has ob-
jected to operations initiated in the past by the United States, most notably
in Haiti, Iraq, and the Balkans, it has established a precedent of abstaining
from contentious votes. France generally supports peacekeeping and humani-
tarian interventions with generous support of troops and resources2, with the
highest profile push-back being during the crisis in Bosnia[26].
For much of the history of the UN, then, discord within the Security
Council has revolved around disagreements between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Affinity scores from UNGA voting patterns corroborate
this story, with preference disparity between the superpowers being greatest
immediately surrounding important historical events such as the Berlin Crisis,
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the early stages of Soviet military action in
Afghanistan.
It is these wide gaps in preferences that best explain peacekeeping de-
ployment trends. Mistrust during periods of heightened tension leads P5 mem-
bers to believe that UN peacekeeping missions are not being used to foment
peace, but rather achieve geopolitical goals. Thus, discord amongst the mem-
bers of the P5 and the institutional arrangement of their veto power makes
agreement on peacekeeping missions makes their deployment less likely.
Hypothesis 1. UN peacekeepers are more (less) likely to get sent when pref-
erences amongst the P5 are (not) aligned
2See [19] for data on specific troop contributions to UN missions by country and by year.
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However, we should expect P5 discord to affect not only the likelihood
of a mission, but also the makeup of it as well. The voluntary nature of
UN peacekeeping missions means that when the UNSC votes to approve a
mission, it also proposes a number of peacekeepers for that mission. However,
UN members are under no obligation to volunteer troops. The UN does not
have its own standing force and draws all of the troops it deploys from forces
voluntarily proportioned by UN members. Thus, even though a P5 member
may abstain from a vote or vote to support a mission, it need not necessarily
deploy its own troops. I argue that discord not only makes missions less likely,
it makes P5 troop contributions to missions that do get approved less likely.
The narrative here is chiefly one between the United States and the
Soviet Union and also U.S.-Russian relations in the mid-1990’s. Though all five
members of the P5 abstained at one point or another during the Cold War on
votes of peacekeeping mission, the Soviet Union did so much more often than
others (six abstentions versus no more than one for any other member.) In the
mid-1990’s, with a surge of anti-Western rhetoric and sentiment, U.S.-Russian
relations were once again strained, but the Russian Federation continued the
Soviet trend of abstaining from UNSC votes. This would indicate that there
are some missions that P5 members do not necessarily want to support, but
do not feel strongly enough to veto. While this trade-off between vetoing
and abstaining undoubtedly deserves its own analysis, for the purposes of this
paper I simply hypothesize that given that a peacekeeping mission has passed,
discord amongst the P5 affects individual member contributions.
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Hypothesis 2. Individual members of the P5 are more (less) likely to con-
tribute to UN peacekeeping missions when preferences amongst the P5 are (not)
aligned
Secondary Hypotheses: Conflict-Specific Characteristics
While the above theory explains the major historical trends in peace-
keeping deployment, I also briefly discuss two characteristics that are specific
to a conflict that also affect the rate of missions. While the list of possible
characteristics may be long, I choose to focus on two and do so for two rea-
sons. First of all, both have been largely ignored in the literature as points of
interest for P5 members. Secondly, and more importantly, I believe that these
conflict characteristics give leverage and interesting insight into the question
of when members of the P5 have enough of a vested interest in a conflict to
press for peacekeepers.3
The first of these conflict-specific characteristics is geographic proxim-
ity. I propose that great powers take it upon themselves to maintain stability
in their regions. Whether it be through economic or coercive means, the
permanent five police their own geographical neighborhoods and avoid UN
intervention on their backdoor. For instance, the United States prefers to
help resolve conflicts and maintain order in Central America and China would
rather do the same in East Asia than have the U.N. become involved. Two
3Keeping in line with the literature, I do include in the appendix models including the
standard measures for P5 interest, namely economic ties and a previous colonial history.
This is discussed at greater length in the results section.
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obvious reasons for this hesitance come to mind. First of all, P5 members
may simply dislike the prospect of having foreign troops near their borders,
especially if some of those troops come from a rival state. This would be espe-
cially true at the height of the Cold War, as will be covered below. Secondly,
and relatedly, P5 members are more likely to prevent peacekeeping missions
from being deployed in their geographic neighborhood in order to maintain
their own political and economic sovereignty as well as influence over the area.
This is specifically referenced by Fravel [12], who argues that China considers
peacekeeping as “immical to its interest because [aspects of it] infringe on na-
tional sovereignty.” Believing that the great powers are hesitant to allow UN
peacekeepers nearby, I posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. UN peacekeepers are less (more) likely to get sent to conflict
zones near (far from) permanent members of the UNSC
Another conflict-specific characteristic is previous military involvement
by a P5 member in the conflict itself. Two points are noteworthy here. First,
the state’s involvement in the conflict indicates that it has significant interest
in the outcome of the conflict and is a stakeholder in this outcome. If this were
not the case, the P5 member would not have become involved in the conflict in
the first place. Secondly, given that war is costly, both in terms of human lives
and materiel, involvement means that the state has already spent significant
resources on the conflict. Even small amounts of troops imply a large cost on
an outside intervener into a civil war. The P5 member prefers peace after the
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war but would also prefer that this peace come without additional cost on top
of those paid during the conflict. In other words, the state that has already
intervened prefers to free-ride on the public good of post-conflict peace rather
than pay the brunt of the costs. By involving UN peacekeepers, the state can
have a higher likelihood of long-term peace without assuming all of the cost
itself. Therefore, I generate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. UN peacekeepers are more likely to get sent to conflicts that
had prior military involvement by a P5 member
Key Assumption
The theory outlined above is undergirded by one chief assumption and
that is that states believe peacekeeping to be effective in keeping peace. I do
not make claims as to the efficacy of peacekeeping or examine why missions
are or are not effective.4 However, I do assume that states believe missions to
be effective in preventing further war. This assumption seems tenable given
that the historical trend of peacekeeping is towards more missions, not less.
Theories without this assumption would need to explain why peacekeeping is
becoming more common although states do not believe it to be effective in its
stated task.
4See [10] for possible causal mechanisms as to why peacekeeping helps keep peace
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Why the UN?
Lastly, it is worth asking why in this project I focus mainly on UN
peacekeeping and do not consider peacekeeping more generally (ie. in regional
IGO’s, unilateral interventions, etc.). I do so for three fundamental reasons.
First of all, the majority of peacekeeping missions have been sent under UN
auspices. Although there has been an uptick in the number of regional and even
unilateral peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeep-
ing remains the most common. I believe it is important to be able to explain
the most “typical” cases of peacekeeping before moving on to theorize about
less common cases. Secondly, there are theoretical grounds for analyzing UN
peacekeeping as distinct from general peacekeeping. The bargaining process is
different when considering unilateral, regional IOs, and UN peacekeeping, as I
have outlined above. Unilateral missions require no institutional bargaining at
the international level. Regional IOs lack the bargaining dynamic of the great
powers veto power within the UNSC. Therefore, we may need to separate out
the three different phenomena rather than considering where peacekeepers go
in general. Thirdly, I focus on the UN because of data issues. More and finer-
grain data exists for UN peacekeeping missions as opposed to regional IO and
unilateral missions. This fine-grain data allow for more analytical leverage on






For the analyses, I utilize two different datasets. Firstly, I use PRIO’s
Armed Conflict Dataset, which covers both intrastate and interstate conflicts
from 1946-2008. I aggregate intrastate and interstate conflicts together be-
cause my theory of P5 discord and the desire to achieve peace makes no dis-
tinction between intrastate and interstate conflicts.1 The data cover all years
of possible UN peacekeeping and allow me to focus on my theoretical story of
peacekeeping during and after conflict. As I do not look at temporal variation
within missions or conflicts, the unit of analysis is simply conflict. I limit the
analysis to cases of conflict with at least 1,000 cumulative battle deaths, leav-
ing 223 observations of intrastate and interstate conflict. In addition, I have
merged in data from COW regarding alliance relationships. Right-censored
observations, meaning either conflicts or peacekeeping missions that are ongo-
ing in the data, have been dropped from the set.
To test troop contribution trends, I use a new dataset from Kathman
1Though UN peacekeepers get sent more often to civil conflict versus intrastate war,
some notable intrastate conflicts that receive UN missions include the Indo-Pakistan war in
1965, several missions to the Balkans in the 1990’s, and after the Yom Kippur War.
17
[19] that records personnel commitment to UN peacekeeping missions from
1990-2010.2 Though the data are disaggregated at the mission level to show
individual country contributions by month and by personnel type, I have col-
lapsed the data to look at yearly trends in keeping with the yearly analysis
of P5 discord. These data allow me to capture whether individual states con-
tribute to missions and include variables for distance from a P5 member as well
as P5 member involvement in the conflict. In this case, the unit of analysis is
mission-state-year.
To test my hypotheses, I employ binary logit models. This is fitting
due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, as the UN either
deploys peacekeepers to a conflict or it does not and individual members ei-
ther contribute to a mission or they do not. Given the relatively small number
of conflicts and relatively large number of peacekeeping missions, the analy-
sis of whether a conflict receives peacekeepers does not warrant a rare events
logit. The same is true for the model analyzing state contributions to mis-
sions. Individual P5 states contribute to peacekeeping missions in 54% of the
observations.
2Though I would prefer a more extensive dataset in order to evaluate possible differences
in trends between the Cold War and post-Cold War era, one virtue of the sample is that it
covers the majority of UN peacekeeping missions and there still remains significant variation
in P5 discord during this period
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in my analysis is the presence of a UN peace-
keeping mission during or after a conflict. By 2008, there had been 67 UN
peacekeeping missions deployed around the world. However, many of these
missions were simply continuations of previous missions and are different
chiefly in name only.3 In order to prevent overstating the distinct number
of UN peacekeeping missions sent, I code the dependent variable as 1 only
if it represents a fundamentally new mission. Operationally, this means that
at least one year has passed since the end of a previous mission in the same
country. Consistent with the literature, I do not consider missions in which
no troops were on the ground, such as the mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)
in 2002. Missions of these type are classified as “peacebuilding” missions and
do not focus on bringing an end to conflict or the enforcement of ceasefires or
treaties but rather the building of institutions and infrastructure. Given this
operationalization, there are 47 cases of peacekeeping in the dataset out of a
total N of 223 cases. I also do not examine the specific type or makeup of the
mission but instead consider it a simple binary variable.4 I draw these data
3A good example of this is Angola receiving three “different” missions: UNAVEM I,
UNAVEM II, and UNAVEM III. While the organizational structure of the mission changed,
it is not necessarily correct to say that Angola received three distinct peacekeeping missions.
4Although some in the literature divide out peacekeeping into different types, from
lightly-armed monitors to heavily-armed enforcement missions, for this analysis I choose
not to make a similar distinction. My theory focuses on when P5 members would and




In the case of the second group of models, I use a binary dependent
variable that captures if a state did or did not send troops to a UN mission
during a given mission year. The “troop” variable captures troops, police, or
armed observers.
Explanatory Variables
The major explanatory variable of interest is a measure of discord be-
tween the great powers and comes from Voeten’s [33] UN general assembly
voting data. The variable captures the difference in voting behaviors relative
to the United States. To operataionalize the discord measure I construct a
variable that measures the greatest difference in the ideal points between any
two of the P5 members in a given year.6 Larger values for the score indicate
greater disagreement between P5 members, as captured by United Nations
General Assembly voting behaviors. For much of the data, this is simply the
difference in ideal points between the United States and the Soviet Union,
though in a handful of cases the most opposed states are France and the So-
viet Union. In order to examine how recent discord affects current decisions
to send peacekeepers, I lag the variable one year. Based on my hypotheses, I
expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.
5For more detailed explanations of mission types, see Fortna [10] and Doyle and Sambanis
[6]
6See [33] for a comprehensive explanation of how ideal points are calculated and mea-
sured.
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To examine my secondary hypotheses, I utilize two explanatory vari-
ables. The first is distance of the UN mission country from the nearest perma-
nent member of the UNSC. This measure is designed to test the theory that
great powers do not wish to have peacekeepers on their geographical backdoor.
For the statistical analysis, I take the log of the distance from the two capitals
in miles. My expectation is that as the distance between the capitals goes up,
the likelihood of U.N. peacekeeping will go up, as well.
The next explanatory variable is a dummy measure for prior involve-
ment in the conflict by a member of the P5. As outlined in the theory section,
I hypothesize that conflicts with prior P5 involvement are more likely to see
UN peacekeepers because the intervener attempts to outsource the peacekeep-
ing process and have other states shoulder the load. The variable is coded as
1 when the PRIO data report a P5 member as a side in the conflict and 0
otherwise.
Controls and Robustness
For robustness checks, I run a number of models that include control
variables that are often cited in the peacekeeping literature as having an ef-
fect on deployment patterns. The first is a control variable to capture the
presence of a formal alliance between the country experiencing conflict and
any P5 member. It is conceivable that P5 members are more likely to push
for peacekeepers if they have a formal alliance with one of the parties in the
conflict. For interstate conflict, I code the variable as 1 if any of the parties
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in the conflict have a formal alliance, meaning non-aggression or defense pact,
with a P5 member. I draw this data from COW. I also add a control variable
for commonly used proxy for P5 interest: colonial history. Colonial history
is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the conflict country was a
colony of a P5 member. Many have argued [10, 11, 24, 13] that a colonial
history makes a colonizer more likely to intervene on the behalf of their for-
mer colonies. In the second round of models, I include a dummy variable for
“lootable resources,”7 which has also been cited as a possible source of P5
interest in a conflict [25, 5, 14].




Table 5.1 shows the results of the first group of logit models, which
measure the effect of the explanatory variables on whether or not peacekeeping
missions get sent to conflict zones. In the first model specification, involving
only the explanatory variables of interest, all three coefficients demonstrate the
expected sign and the measures for P5 discord and previous P5 involvement
both reach statistical significance. The relatively low p value on the distance
coefficient (0.12) provides some support for the secondary hypothesis that
peacekeepers are less likely to be sent to conflicts that are near P5 members.
Two interesting results when including the control variables. First of
all, the “colony” coefficients across the different specifications do not sup-
port the story that former colonies of P5 members are more likely to receive
peacekeepers. The colony measure never approaches statistical significance,
suggesting that there is not a robust relationship between colonial history and
peacekeeping missions. Secondly, the sign on all of the specifications for the
P5 alliance measure are actually negative, suggesting that states with formal
alliances with P5 members are actually less likely to receive peacekeeping mis-
sions. This finding is most robust when aggregating the different types of
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Table 5.1: Likelihood a Mission is Sent
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
P5 discord -0.770* -0.772* -0.744*
(0.334) (0.334) (0.338)
Distance 0.659 0.639 0.403
(0.432) (0.442) (0.453)
Prior P5 Intervention 1.221* 1.206* 1.016
(0.512) (0.518) (0.535)




Constant -3.718 -3.495 -1.239
(3.776) (3.924) (4.049)
N 203 203 203
chi2 10.166 10.207 17.298
*p<0.05, **p<.0.01, ***p<0.001
alliances, but as seen in the models found in the section on robustness checks,
the sign is consistent across alternate specifications.
Overall, empirical results across different model specifications lend sup-
port to the hypotheses that P5 discord and prior involvement play a part in
peacekeeping decisions. The hypothesis that conflicts nearer to P5 members
are less likely to receive peacekeepers has some empirical support across spec-
ifications but these coefficients do not reach statistical significance.
Looking at the second group of models in Table 5.2, which examines
the affect that the explanatory variables have on if a P5 state sends peace-
keepers to a mission in a given year, the results are inconclusive. Though the
coefficients for P5 discord and involvement take on the expected signs, neither
reach statistical significance. Interestingly, the sign for the distance measure is
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negative, though it also does not reach statistical significance. In this case, all
three coefficients have p values above 0.25. This is true for the alternate speci-
fications including control variables for colonial history and lootable resources
(models 2-4). Though both are widely discussed in the literature as a source
of P5 interest in a conflict, the results do not provide evidence that lootable
resources or a colonial history are related with P5 members’ willingness to
deploy peacekeeping troops to a UN mission.
Table 5.2: Likelihood of P5 Members Contributing Troops
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
P5 Discord -0.230 -0.236 -0.219 -0.225
(0.196) (0.199) (0.201) (0.204)
Distance -0.210 -0.213 -0.197 -0.200
(0.218) (0.222) (0.220) (0.224)
Prior P5 Intervention 0.269 0.267 0.262 0.261
(0.225) (0.225) (0.226) (0.226)
Colonial History -0.106 -0.105
(0.516) (0.515)
Lootable Resources 0.191 0.191
(0.503) (0.504)
Constant 2.253 2.342 1.993 2.082
(1.918) (2.090) (2.041) (2.225)
N 1500 1500 1500 1500
chi2 3.587 3.612 3.993 4.007
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Robustness Checks
I employ a number of additional models for robustness checks and alter-
native specifications. First of all, though the P5 discord variable is intended
to capture the major international systemic factors that differ between the
Cold War and post-Cold War periods, I run a separate model for each time
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period, with the results noted in table 5.3. For the Cold War period, the coef-
ficients for P5 discord and the geography both take on the expected signs, but
along with the P5 prior involvement coefficient, do not approach statistical
significance (all have p values above 0.3).
Table 5.3: Likelihood a Mission is Sent: Cold War and Post-Cold War
Variables Cold War Post-Cold War










* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
In the Post-Cold War period, there is strong support for hypotheses 3
and 4, that geographical proximity lessens the likelihood of deployment and
prior involvement by a P5 member increases the likelihood of UN peacekeep-
ers. However, my chief hypothesis dealing with P5 discord receives very little
support. This highlights the chief trend in the data, that the post-Cold War
period has the majority of the peacekeeping missions but not as much variation
in the P5 discord measure.
I also investigate whether the type or number of P5 alliances has any
systematic relationship with the deployment of UN peacekeepers. In table 5.4
I disaggregate the COW measure of alliance to be a defense pact (model 1)
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or a formal treaty of nonaggresion (model 2). Model 3 uses a measure for the
number of P5 alliances that the conflict state has. That is, if the civil war
is occurring in Burma, how many states of the P5 have formal alliances with
Burma?
Table 5.4: Likelihood a Mission is Sent: Alliances
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
P5 Discord -0.773* -0.751* -0.776*
(0.334) (0.334) (0.337)
Distance 0.634 0.384 0.204
(0.445) (0.459) (0.478)
Prior P5 Involvement 1.209* 0.939 0.839
(0.519) (0.537) (0.550)






Number of P5 Allies -0.742*
(0.326)
Constant -3.441 -1.138 0.591
(3.966) (4.125) (4.328)
N 203 203 203
chi2 10.216 13.540 16.070
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Once again, the P5 discord takes on the expected sign across all three
specifications. Model 1, including only defense pacts, also maintains statistical
significance for prior P5 involvement. The coefficients, as in previous models,
have the expected positive sign but we cannot draw any concrete conclusions
due to the large p values. Interestingly, the number of P5 allies that a conflict
state has seems to actually lessen the likelihood of mission deployment. It may
be that this is capturing the same phenomena as the consistent findings above
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that prior P5 involvement makes peacekeeping more likely. That is, it may
be that the greater the number of P5 formal alliances, the more likely that a
member will intervene in the conflict. Once this occurs, the intervener pushes




What explains UN peacekeeping trends? I argue that it is ultimately
a story of great power interest and the international political environment.
I see strong empirical support for my main hypothesis, that the chief driver
of peacekeeping deployment decisions in the UNSC is the state of the in-
ternational system. Disagreements on preferences amongst the P5 make it
considerably less likely that peacekeepers are deployed. When discord is high
(such as during much of the Cold War), missions are less likely. I also find
support for one of my two secondary hypotheses: if a permanent member has
intervened in the conflict previously, UN peacekeepers are more likely to get
sent, suggesting that the P5 may want to avoid further costs on top of those
incurred during the war and pass on the costs of peacekeeping to the UN.
I find that distance also has some effect on whether or not missions
are sent. That is, the P5 avoid having UN peacekeepers in their backyard,
whether it be due to concerns of sovereignty or a desire to police their own
neighborhoods. Despite past theories, I find no empirical support for the
assertion that P5 colonies are more likely to receive peacekeepers and varied
results on the alliance measures.
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This project is important for two key reasons. First of all, it high-
lights the importance that the state of the international system plays in UN
peacekeeping decisions. The results suggest that researchers should not focus
solely on the characteristics of conflicts or on interveners in order to under-
stand deployment trends. The organizational setup of the UNSC and the veto
power of all P5 members play a very large part in the decision to send troops.
Secondly, as mentioned previously, the factors regarding when peacekeepers
are sent have strong implications for the answer of how effective peacekeepers
are at keeping peace. Unless P5 discord and prior intervention by one of the
members combine to create systematically “easy” cases of peacekeeping, there
is little reason to think that recent findings of peacekeeping effectiveness [10]
suffer from a selection effect.
With that being said, there is more work to be done in the study of UN
mission selection. First of all, while the UN affinity scores provide a rough idea
of the great power environment in a given year, finer grain analysis may help
unlock temporal variations within (and after) the Cold War. Relatedly, how
have trends in abstention votes changed during this time period? Descriptive
statistics indicate that China and Russia both began abstaining from UNSC
votes much more frequently since the end of the Cold War. This trend coin-
cides with a jump in the number of approved missions. What explains when
a P5 member abstains versus when it vetoes and undesired peacekeeping mis-
sion? Secondly, while there seems to be a robust relationship between prior
P5 intervention and UN peacekeeping, the causal link there is by no means
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clear. A better understanding of why P5 involvement leads to UN peacekeep-
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